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THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST: EQUITY'S ANSWER TO 
THE NEED FOR A STRONG DETERRENT TO THE 
DESTRUCTION OF HISTORIC LANDMARKS 
Jane Papademetriou Kourtis* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the destruction of buildings classified as historic 
landmarksl has received national attention. 2 In response to this 
growing concern, federal, state, and local legislatures have passed 
laws that protect historic landmarks. 3 
Although most historic preservation laws provide for penalties 
against landmark owners who violate relevant statutory provisions, 
preservationists have struggled with the question of whether these 
penalties are strong enough to be effective. 4 In ordering penalties, 
courts must weigh the important public interest in preserving the 
nation's heritage, through its historical and architecturally signifi-
* Clinical Placement Director, 1988-89, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW 
REVIEW. 
I A historic property may be designated as an individual landmark or as a structure within 
a historic district. See 11 Historic Preservation Law & Taxation, Real Estate Transactions 
(MB) § 1.03[3] (1987) [hereinafter Preservation Law & Taxation]. Generally, it is not overly 
important whether a structure is designated individually as a landmark or as part of a historic 
district. C. Duerkson, Local Preservation Law, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION 
LAW 29 (1983). This Comment focuses on individual properties, whether designated as a 
landmark or part of a historic district, but the thesis expressed may also be applied to entire 
historic districts. 
2 See Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at iii. 
3 See id. For examples of such laws, see National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 470 (1982); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40C, §§ 1-17 (1986); 1975 Mass. Acts 772; NEW YORK, NY 
ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976), cited in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 109 (1977); CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, §§ 21-62 to 21-95 (1987). 
4 See Dennis, Recommended Model Provisions for a Preservation Ordinance, With Anno-
tations, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW AI, A123 (1983). 
793 
794 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:793 
cant buildings, against the interests of private landowners. 5 Many 
landmark owners feel constrained by landmark designation, claiming 
that their property would be more valuable if it were not so encum-
bered. 6 
Despite the potential conflict between private landmark owners 
and society at large, Congress, state, and local legislatures have 
decided that historic preservation is a valuable goal and have passed 
laws to protect historic landmarks. 
Most historic preservation ordinances provide for a landmark com-
mission to initiate and oversee the preservation of historic sites. 7 A 
commission usually has the power to designate a property as a 
landmark, and thereafter, to direct the maintenance or restoration 
of that property. 8 
Despite the broad power of these commissions and the abundance 
of laws regulating and protecting historic landmarks, landmark own-
ers continue to violate these laws by destroying their property. This 
often results when the penalties imposed by the preservation law 
are small in comparison to the economic return that the owner 
expects to realize through the sale or development of unencumbered 
land. 9 
When a landmark owner violates a preservation ordinance by 
destroying a designated historic landmark, a municipality is forced 
to sue the landmark owner for the statutory violation and the un-
quantifiable loss to society. This litigation forces courts to grapple 
with the question of whether the penalty in an ordinance is strong 
enough to punish the violating landowner and to deter other land-
5 The constitutional arguments regarding the rights of private landowners versus the im-
portance of preserving historic landmarks constitute separate issues that are beyond the scope 
of this Comment but which have been the subject of other law review articles. See, e.g., 
Watson, First Amendment Challenges to Landmark Preservation Statutes, 11 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 115, 132 (1982); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Note, 
Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1562 (1984). Since 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court held that New 
York City's landmark preservation ordinance as applied to Grand Central Station did not 
constitute a taking of property, historic preservationists have been confident about the con-
stitutionality of most historic preservation laws. See Lang, Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City: Fairness and Accommodation Show the Way Out of the Takings Corner, 
13 URB. LAW. 89 (Wint. 1981). 
6 See D. LISTOKIN, LANDMARKS PRESERVATION AND THE PROPERTY TAX 43-44 (1982). 
But see id. at 29-43 (discussion of evidence that historic landmark designation frequently 
increases property values). 
7 See infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text. 
8 See id. 
9 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[11] n.95; Duerkson, supra note 1, 
at 121 (1983). 
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mark owners from committing similar violations. In any event, the 
landmark is lost. 
Because the goal of historic preservation is to prevent destruction 
of historic landmarks rather than to impose penalties after destruc-
tion, a stronger deterrent than current penalties is necessary. In an 
effort to impose an appropriate penalty on a landmark owner whose 
fraud resulted in demolition of the landmark, an Illinois court applied 
the equitable remedy of a constructive trust. 10 A constructive trust 
arises, typically, when a person holding title to property is subject 
to an equitable duty to transfer the title to another party in order 
to prevent the unjust enrichment of the holder of the title. 11 Today, 
the constructive trust is a device of wide application, but its main 
purpose continues to be the prevention of unjust enrichment. 12 
The application of the constructive trust in Illinois was significant 
because no court had ever before used it in a landmark preservation 
case. By using the constructive trust, the court was able to order 
the defendant landmark owner to pay the penalties in the ordinance 
as well as the money he saved by demolishing the property instead 
of moving and restoring it, as he had earlier agreed to do. 13 
Because the goal of historic preservation is to prevent demolition, 
rather than to impose penalties after destruction, the application of 
a constructive trust could serve as the most effective deterrent to 
egregious cases of landmark destruction. If landmark owners believe 
they may be exposed to a judicially created penalty of unknown 
severity in addition to the statutory penalty, they might hesitate 
before disturbing or letting fall into disrepair a historic landmark. 
Thus, the constructive trust could serve as both a strong penalty 
against violators and a strong deterrent to similar conduct on the 
part of other landmark owners. 
This Comment explores the potential use of the constructive trust 
for cases involving the degradation of historic landmarks. The second 
section presents a background of historic preservation law, discusses 
the interaction between federal, state, and local preservation law, 
and explores the inadequacy of the typical statutory penalties used 
in landmark preservation cases. The third section focuses on the 
10 City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d 602, 613, 447 N.E.2d 870, 878 (1983). 
11 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937). 
12 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 447 U.S. 507 (1980); Chisholm v. Western Reserves 
Oil Co., 655 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981); LaBarbera v. LaBarbera, 116 Ill. App. 3d 959, 452 N.E.2d 
684 (1983); Estate of Mahoney, 220 A.2d 475 (Vt. 1966). See infra notes 199-218 and accom-
panying text. 
13 See City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d 602, 612-13, 447 N.E.2d 870, 878 (1983). 
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evolution of the constructive trust as an equitable remedy, and its 
potential use in historic preservation cases. This Comment applies 
the constructive trust doctrine specifically to historic landmark 
cases, discussing how each element regarding the applicability of the 
constructive trust is satisfied in certain historic landmark cases 
where a landmark has been destroyed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Today, there is a strong national consensus about the importance 
of historic preservation. 14 Historic preservation has grown from a 
mere recognition of old structures that either housed famous people 
or were the site of historically significant events15 to the conservation 
of entire districts and singular properties because of their aesthetic, 
historical, and architectural significance and character. 16 
A. Common Law Authority for Historic Preservation 
Courts have recognized the importance of landmark preservation 
since the late 1800's, beginning with United States v. Gettysburg 
Electric Railway CO.17 In that case, the United States sought to 
condemn the Gettysburg Battlefield area, a historically significant 
Civil War site. IS The United States Supreme Court upheld the fed-
eral government's power to acquire property for preservation pur-
poses, approving Congress's desire to preserve the battlefield as a 
legitimate and constitutional objective. 19 
More recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also 
recognized the importance of preserving historic landmarks.20 The 
Massachusetts senate asked the court to assess the validity of pro-
posed enabling legislation authorizing the preservation and protec-
tion of historic buildings, places, and districts in Nantucket. 21 In an 
14 See Duerkson, Preface to A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW at xxi (1983). 
15 C. Duerkson & D. Bonderman, Preservation Law: Where It's Been, Where It's Going, in 
A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 1 (1983). 
16 See id. at 7, 13. Affirmative maintenance and restoration is allowed in some cases, as long 
as it is not unduly oppressive to the owner of the property. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 
516 F.2d 1051, 1067 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). 
17 160 U.S. 668 (1896). 
18 See id. at 669-70, 671. 
19 [d. at 681-82. 
20 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 780-81, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (1955). 
21 [d. at 773, 128 N.E.2d at 558. The inquiry related to a proposed act known as House No. 
775, then pending before the Massachusetts Senate, entitled "An Act establishing a historic 
districts commission for the town of Nantucket and defining its powers and duties, and 
establishing historic districts in the town of Nantucket." [d. at 774, 128 N.E.2d at 558. 
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Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, the court stated that the 
historic preservation act promoted the public welfare, and noted the 
national interest in preserving historic buildings, places, and dis-
tricts. 22 
Judicial tolerance of historic preservation expanded in the 1970's. 
In Maher v. City of New Orleans,23 the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court's decision24 
to uphold New Orleans' refusal to grant permission to demolish a 
late nineteenth century Victorian cottage in the city's French Quar-
ter.25 The court upheld historic preservation as a legitimate state 
goal,26 affirming the city's determination regarding the cottage's 
historical and architectural value.27 
The strongest support for the legitimacy of historic preservation 
came from the United States Supreme Court in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City.28 In Penn Central, the Court upheld 
New York City's historic preservation ordinance. 29 The Court's de-
cision significantly strengthened the status of historic preservation. 30 
In Penn Central, the owners of Grand Central Terminal, a histor-
ically and architecturally significant structure designated aNew 
York City landmark,31 wanted to build an office tower above the 
terminal. 32 According to the N ew York City landmark commission, 
this new tower would ruin the appearance and the original design of 
Grand Central Station.33 After the landmark commission refused to 
issue a building permit regarding this development proposal,34 the 
22 See id. at 780, 128 N.E.2d at 562. 
23 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). When the Fifth Circuit 
decided Maher, it cited Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (court deemed demolition 
of a building for aesthetic reasons a constitutionally sound "public purpose") and stated that 
the constitutional requirement of a proper public purpose is very broad and may include not 
only the abatement of certain undesirable activities but also the promotion of goals that a 
community deems worthwhile. See Maher, 516 F.2d at 1060. In upholding New Orleans' 
historic preservation ordinance, id. at 1067, the court noted the country's increasing desire to 
preserve sites with historical and cultural value. Id. at 1060. 
24 Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), aii'd, 516 F.2d 1051 
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). 
25 Maher, 516 F.2d at 1067. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1060. 
2B 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
29 See id. at 138. 
30 C. Duerkson & D. Bonderman, supra note 15, at 17. 
31 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-16. 
32 Id. at 116. 
33 Id. at 117-18. 
34 Id. at 117. 
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owners challenged the validity of the N ew York City ordinance that 
gave the commission its permitting power. N ew York's highest court 
upheld the ordinance. 35 
On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
the city's action to preserve structures and districts with historic, 
architectural, or cultural significance did not constitute an imper-
missible taking in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 36 
The Court reasoned that because there was a reasonable remaining 
economic use of the property, there was no taking. 37 The Court found 
that aesthetic controls may be a proper basis for the government's 
use of the police power. 38 The court noted that "states and cities may 
enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life 
by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city 
•••• "39 Justice Brennan wrote for the majority: "Not only do these 
buildings and their workmanship represent the lessons of the past 
and embody precious features of our heritage, they serve as exam-
ples of quality for today. "40 
B. Statutory Authority for Historic Preservation 
Buttressed by judicial approval of historic preservation goals, fed-
eral, state, and local governments have enacted numerous historic 
preservation statutes. 41 Although local ordinances are the major 
force behind historic preservation in this country today, it is useful 
to look at federal and state laws for the legal foundation they pro-
vide. 42 
35 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324,337,366 N.E.2d 1271, 
1278-79 (1977). 
36 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107, 138. 
37 See id. at 121-22. 
38 I d. at 133-34. 
39 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129. 
4°Id. at 108. Lower courts also recognized the importance of historic preservation. In the 
Penn Central decision in the Court of Appeals of New York, Judge Breitel wrote: "[New 
York City 1 should not be forced to choose between witnessing the demolition of its glorious 
past and mortgaging its hopes for the future." Penn Central, 42 N.Y.2d at 337,366 N.E.2d 
at 1278 (1977). 
41 See, e.g., Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1982); Historic Sites, Buildings 
and Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1982); National Historic Preservation Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 470 (1982); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40C, §§ 1-17 (1986); 1975 Mass. Acts 772; CHICAGO, 
ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, §§ 21-62 to 21-95 (1987); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, 
§ 205-1.0 (1976), cited in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 109 
(1977). 
42 See Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.01. 
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1. Federal Historic Preservation Statutes 
The Antiquities Act of 190643 was the earliest federal preservation 
statute. 44 This statute gives the President the authority to designate 
and protect historic landmarks, structures, and objects located on 
lands controlled by the United States as national monuments. 45 This 
statute also gives the Executive the authority to grant permits for 
archeological excavations of federal land, 46 and provides for criminal 
and civil penalties for violations of the Act. 47 
In 1935, Congress expanded the scope of historic preservation by 
passing the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act.48 This 
statute recognizes the importance of historic buildings and districts 
of national significance. 49 
The Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act empowers the 
Secretary of the Interior to perform various duties and functions 
related to historic preservation. 50 The statute gives the Secretary 
the power to secure data of historic sites, buildings, and objects, 
and to make a survey of such historic sites, buildings, and objects. 51 
The Act also gives the Secretary the ability to acquire, in the 
name of the United States, by gift, purchase, or otherwise, any 
property interest of the historical estate, as long as the acquisition 
is with the consent of the owner. 52 The Secretary is further empow-
ered to contract and make cooperative agreements with state or 
municipal governments or individuals to protect, preserve, maintain, 
restore, and reconstruct historic properties. 53 
Although the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act grants 
the Secretary of the Interior more specific powers than the earlier 
Antiquities Act, neither act sets forth specific methods of implemen-
tation. 54 It was not until 1966 that Congress passed a statute that 
more specifically implemented methods of preserving historic land-
43 16 u.s.c. §§ 431-433 (1982). 
44 Bell, Protecting the Built Environment: An Overview of Federal Historic Preservation 
Law, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10354 (Nov. 1985). 
45 16 U.S.C. § 431. 
46Id. § 432. 
47 See id. § 433. 
48 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1982). 
49 See id. § 461. 
50 Id. § 462. 
51Id. § 462(a)-(b). 
52Id. § 462(d). 
53 Id. § 462(e)-(f). 
54 See, Bell, supra note 44, at 10354. 
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marks. In 1966, the United States Conference of Mayors55 compiled 
a report that identified a need for a more comprehensive national 
plan for the protection of historic resources. 56 In response to this 
study,57 Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHP A).58 Congress was convinced of the importance of historic 
preservation, stating that preservation of historic and cultural sites 
was necessary "to give a sense of orientation to the American peo-
ple. "59 
It is clear that Congress intended to pass a statute that would not 
only express the importance of historic preservation, but would also 
provide a means for its implementation. For example, NHPA, which 
remains the primary federal historic preservation statute,60 author-
izes the Secretary of the Interior to maintain a National Register of 
Historic Places. 61 The National Register is an official list of national 
historic and culturallandmarks-designated either by the Secretary 
or by state or municipal governments-that have been deemed wor-
thy of preservation. 62 
NHP A does not protect properties listed on the National Register 
from destruction. 63 Local ordinances generally are the only laws with 
the power to prevent the destruction or alteration of historic prop-
erties. 64 The National Register is significant, however, because it 
enables property owners who preserve the historical nature of their 
buildings to receive federal tax benefits.65 The Tax Reform Act of 
197666 contained a series of new provisions that offered economic 
incentives for rehabilitation work and preservation of historic build-
ings.67 For example, the Act offered valuable depreciation rates for 
55 See generally SPECIAL COMM. ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAY-
ORS, WITH HERITAGE So RICH (1966). 
56 I d. at 208. 
57 C. Duerkson & D. Bonderman, supra note 15, at 8-10. 
58 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1982). 
59 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2). 
60 NHPA was passed in 1966, and today it remains the primary federal historic preservation 
law. C. Duerkson & D. Bonderman, supra note 15, at 10. 
61 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A). 
62 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 2.02[1]. 
63 Id. at § 2.02[2]. 
64 Id. at § 1.04[3]. 
65Id. at § 2.02[2] & n.60 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 48(g)(3), 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), (h)(4)(B)(1982). 
66 26 U.S.C. § 191 (1976)(repealed 1981). In 1981, Congress allowed owners of historic 
structures to take investment tax credits for rehabilitation of historic structures. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 48(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Roddewig, Preservation Law and Economics, in A HANDBOOK 
ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 427,467 (1983). 
67 See 26 U.S.C. § 191 (1976) (repealed 1981); C. Duerkson & D. Bonderman, supra note 
15, at 18. 
1989] HISTORIC PRESERVATION 801 
approved rehabilitation expenditures to owners of properties listed 
in the National Register.68 It also allowed a charitable deduction if 
an owner donated a preservation easement, such as an easement 
promising not to alter or demolish a landmark, to a nonprofit or 
governmental entity.69 In an attempt to deter owners from illegally 
demolishing their structures, the Act also denied a deduction of 
demolition expenses and use of accelerated depreciation for replace-
ment structures to deter owners from illegally demolishing their 
structures. 70 By 1981, through these tax incentives, an estimated 
$1.8 billion in rehabilitation work had been done in furtherance of 
historic preservation. 71 
The National Register is also significant because it triggers 
NHPA's Section 106 Review Process, which requires that the Ad-
visory Council on Historic Preservation scrutinize any federal agency 
actions that have an effect upon National Register property.72 Thus, 
although the listing of a historic property in the National Register 
is largely honorific in terms of its protection of properties from 
alteration and destruction, the list does put a locality on notice of a 
property's significance in the hope that the local landmark commis-
sion will take measures to protect the landmark. 73 
NHP A also regulates and encourages state and local preservation 
programs. 74 For example, NHPA gives the Secretary of the Interior 
the authority to regulate state and local historic preservation pro-
grams by requiring the appointment of a state historic preservation 
officer and board, and by periodically evaluating such programs. 75 
NHP A also allows state historic preservation officers to certify the 
eligibility of local governments to participate in NHP A benefits. 76 
After such programs are created, NHPA encourages them by pro-
viding matching grants-in-aid to states for historic preservation proj-
ects. 77 NHPA's grant program earmarks funds for states, historic 
68 C. Duerkson & D. Bonderman, supra note 15, at 18. 
69 [d. 
70 [d. 
71 [d. at 19. 
72 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 2.02[2]. The Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation is an independent agency of the federal government, 16 U.S.C. § 470i(a) (1982), 
responsible for advising the President on matters relilting to historic preservation and en-
couraging private and public interest in historic preservation. [d. at § 470j(a)(IH2). 
73 See Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 2.02[2]. 
74 See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(bHc) (1982). 
75 See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b)(I)(AHB),(2). 
76 See id. § 470a(c)(1). 
77 [d. § 470a(d). 
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preservation projects, and individuals, to encourage the preservation 
of properties listed in the National Register. 78 
Since NHPA was first enacted, Congress has passed amendments 
to the Act79 as well as other statutes that protect historic land-
marks. 80 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEP A)81 requires 
federal agencies to evaluate the impact of their planning and deci-
sionmaking on the environment,82 including historic properties. 83 The 
Department of Transportation Act84 and the Federal-Aid Highway 
Act85 require that federal agencies proceed with projects affecting 
historic properties only when there is no prudent and feasible alter-
native and the projects have been planned to minimize harm to 
historic properties. 86 
It is apparent, then, that Congress has recognized the importance 
of historic preservation not only by passing specific legislation, but 
also by including restrictions in other statutes that protect historic 
sites. 
2. State Historic Preservation Statutes 
Today all fifty states, and more than 500 municipalities, have 
enacted laws to provide incentives for or to mandate the preservation 
of buildings and areas with historic or aesthetic importance. 87 State 
78 See id. § 470a(d)(1), (3)(A)(iv). 
79 National Historical Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 
2987 (1980). 
80 The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-157 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 
The Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 101-126 (1982). 
81 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). 
82Id. §§ 4332-4341(2)(c). 
83 Id. § 4331(b)(4). 
84 49 U.S.C. §§ 101--526 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
85 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-157 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
86 49 U.S.C. § 303(c)(1)-(2); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1982). The executive branch has also shown 
support for historic preservation. In 1971, five years after Congress passed NHPA, President 
Nixon signed Executive Order No. 11,593 into law. See Exec. Order No. 11,593,3 C.F.R. 559 
(1971-1975), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470, at 549--50 (1982). This order established federal 
agency guidelines for maintaining federal properties. Under this order, federal agencies must 
identify and nominate to the National Register all properties under their jurisdiction or control 
that may qualify for the Register. 
87 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978). Massachusetts' 
historic preservation statute, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40C, §§ 1-17 (1986), provides a good illus-
tration of typical language of the purpose section of a state historic districts statute. The 
purpose of historic preservation is "to promote the educational, cultural, economic and general 
welfare of the public through the preservation and protection of the distinctive characteristics 
of buildings and places significant in the history of the commonwealth and its cities and towns 
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involvement in historic preservation began in the 1950's and early 
1960'S.88 In the 1960's and 1970's, the states undertook primarily 
those responsibilities delegated to them by Congress. 89 States estab-
lished State Historic Preservation Offices (SHPOs)90 that nominated 
properties to the National Register, aided the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation in the NHPA Section 106 Review Process, and 
reviewed applications for federal tax incentive programs. 91 
States playa more expansive role in historic preservation. 92 They 
no longer simply implement federal programs. 93 All states have cre-
ated historic preservation agencies, and a majority of states have 
enacted environmental policy acts which require that the adverse 
effects of governmental actions on the built environment be miti-
gated. 94 A few states have also set historic preservation as a goal in 
their constitutions. 95 Some states have passed tax laws relating to 
the ownership of historic properties. 96 
or their architecture, and through the maintenance and improvement of settings for such 
buildings and places and the encouragement of design compatible therewith." ld. § 1. 
New York's statute, 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 354, § 119-aa, states: 
ld. 
It is hereby declared to be the purpose of this article to encourage local government 
programs for the preservation, restoration and maintenance of the historical, archi-
tectural, archeological and cultural environment by clarifying and amplifying existing 
authority and providing necessary tools for such purpose. The framework provided 
by this article is intended to maintain and encourage the opportunity and flexibility 
for the counties, cities, towns and villages of the state to manage the historic and 
cultural properties ... in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement 
of historic and cultural properties. 
88 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 6.01. 
891d. 
90 ld. 
91 ld. at § 6.01, §' 5.01[1]. 
92 See Mantell, State Preservation Law, in A HANDBOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 
130 (1983). 
93 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 6.01. 
94 Mantell, supra note 92, at 130. 
951d. In 1971, the Pennsylvania legislature added an amendment to its constitution which 
provides that "[t]he people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of 
the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic value of the environment .... " PA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 27. See also Frye, Environmental Provisions in State Constitutions, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 50028, 50029-30 (Feb. 1975); LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18C (Louisiana's Con-
stitution measures taxes for historic properties based on current-use value rather than market 
value as an incentive to historic preservation). 
96 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 12G (1975) (Maryland authorizes localities to award 
tax credits up to a specified percentage for property owners who rehabilitate, restore, or even 
reconstruct a historic property). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-13 (1980); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 72, §§ 4722-4727(Purdon 1982); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977) (New 
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The enactment of state enabling legislation in every jurisdiction is 
a clear indication of state recognition of the importance of preserving 
our nation's architectural heritage. Despite the importance of SHPOs 
and state enabling legislation in facilitating the preservation of his-
toric properties, local ordinances, many of which give local commis-
sions the power to control the alteration and demolition of historic 
properties, are the major force behind historic preservation.97 Ac-
cordingly, the next section discusses the power and effectiveness of 
local ordinances. 
3. Local Historic Preservation Ordinances 
Many localprese~vation ordinances98 derive their authority from 
state enabling legi~hltion. 99 Other ordinances derive their authority 
from a state statutory or constitutional home rule charter.loo Thus, 
although local· governments are a major force in historic preserva-
tion, they must act within the bounds of the authority granted to 
them. 101 
a. History of Local Preservation Ordinances 
In 1931, Charleston, South Carolina became the first locality to 
pass a local, yet comprehensive, preservation ordinance, which cov-
ered the antebellum section of the city.102 In 1937, New Orleans 
passed an ordinance,103 which was upheld by Louisiana's highest 
court,104 protecting the Vieux Carre district. From the 1930's 
through the 1950's the number of local ordinances grew steadily.105 
The number of local preservation commissions has also grown 
York allows localities to satisfy awards for damages in preservation "takings" cases by limiting 
or remitting taxes). 
97 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.01. 
98 For a general discussion of local ordinances, see S. KAss, J. LABELLE & D. HANSELL, 
REHABILITATING OLDER AND HISTORIC BUILDINGS 157-91 (1985). 
99 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-22-2 
(1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (1981). 
100 Mantell, supra note 92, at 131. 
101 See id. 
102 R. RODDEWIG, PREPARING A HISTORIC PRESERVATION ORDINANCE 1 (1983); C. Duerk-
son & D. Bonderman, supra note 15, at 6; Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at 
§ 7.05[1]. 
103 NEW ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCES No. 14,538 C.C.S. (1937). 
104 See City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So.2d 129 (1941). 
105 See R. RODDEWIG, supra note 102, at 1. 
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steadily. By 1983 there were between 800 and 1,000 local historic 
preservation commissions throughout the country. 106 
Today, over 1,000 jurisdictions have passed local ordinances to 
protect historic properties. 107 These ordinances establish preserva-
tion commissions to designate or to recommend for designation his-
toric buildings as landmarks and then to monitor the alteration and 
demolition of these historic buildings. 108 The power of these commis-
sions varies, often depending on the size of the municipality,lo9 the 
number of historic buildings and sites, and the attitude of the com-
munity.110 The typical commission is composed of approximately five 
to nine members,111 and members may be selected from the fields of 
architecture, history, urban planning, archeology, law, and real es-
tate. 112 The commission may also include other interested citizens 
who have demonstrated knowledge and interest in historic preser-
vation. 113 Besides insuring that a commission functions as a well-
informed body, the requirements for a broad-based membership also 
help protect a commission's decisions against court challenge. 114 A 
board comprised of a diverse and knowledgeable membership may 
be better able to refute any claim that it has acted in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner. 115 
A local ordinance, within the limits of its state's enabling legisla-
tion, should have certain components. A historic preservation ordi-
106 Id. 
107 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.01. 
108 See, e.g., SACRAMENTO, CA., CITY CODE § 32.208; ENFIELD, CT., ORDINANCES § 7; 
LOUISVILLE, KY., ORDINANCES § 2(e), cited in Dennis, supra note 4, at 22-23. 
109 See Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.01. 
110 Duerkson, supra note 1, at 71-72. 
111 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[3][a]; see also ALEXANDRIA, VA. 
ORDINANCES § 42089; NEW ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCES § II; OAK PARK, ILL., ORDINANCES 
§ 2, cited in Dennis, supra note 4, at 16. 
112 See Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[3][c]; see also NEW ORLEANS, 
LA., VIEUX CARRE ORDINANCE § 65-2; CHARLESTON, S.C., ORDINANCES § 54-26, cited in 
Dennis, supra note 4, at 19-20. 
113 See Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[3][c]; see also LOUISVILLE, 
KY., ORDINANCES § 2(a), cited in Dennis, supra note 4, at 19-20. The Louisville, Kentucky 
ordinance provides: 
Id. 
Of the members to be appointed by the Mayor at least one shall be an architect; at 
least one shall be an historian qualified in the field of historic preservation; at least 
one shall be a licensed real estate broker; at least one shall be an attorney; and all 
members shall have a known interest in historic landmarks and districts preservation. 
114 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[3][c]; see Duerkson, supra note 1, 
at 69. 
115 See Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[3][c]; Duerkson, supra note 
1, at 69. 
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nance should identify the enabling authority and the purpose of the 
ordinance. It should also establish criteria for the buildings that the 
ordinance is protecting and the methods of administration and en-
forcement. 116 
Perhaps the most ignoredll7 but potentially most critical part of 
the local ordinance is the enforcement and penalty section. This 
section is important because despite the intensity of a community's 
preservation ideals, an ordinance that does not provide for effective 
enforcement can set a trap for the unwary. 118 
The next section will focus on enforcement and penalty sections 
typical of local ordinances, and the reasons why they do not always 
work to prevent demolition of historic landmarks. In particular, the 
next section will focus on the failure of Chicago's ordinance to save 
a designated landmark from destruction. 
b. Enforcement Problems in Local Ordinances 
Enforcement mechanisms can include fines, compliance orders, 
orders to reconstruct the landmark, various forms of injunctive re-
lief, court-ordered receiverships, and imprisonment. u9 Preservation 
law experts caution that penalty provisions should be strong enough 
to deter potential violators, but not so harsh that the penalty is not 
likely to be enforced. 120 If the fines are too small, however, the 
penalty may be viewed merely as an additional cost for a building 
permit. 121 
Monetary fines typically range between $10 to $1,000 per day, 
depending on the nature of the offense and whether the violator is 
a first-time offender. 122 A typical penalty provision requires that any 
person violating the ordinance shall be fined not less than fifteen 
dollars, nor more than one hundred dollars per day, with each day 
116 See R. RODDEWIG, supra note 102, at 7; Preservation Law and Taxation, supra note 1, 
at § 7.03; Duerkson, supra note 1, at 63. 
117 See Stein, Buildings That Go Crash in the Night: A Special Problem in Historic Pre-
servation Law, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 242 (1988) (author asserts that historic preservation penalty 
sections of historic preservation statutes are largely ignored, and the author's solution is to 
impose a higher degree of criminalization as a deterrent to the destruction of historic prop-
erties); see also Duerkson, supra note 1, at 120. 
118 See Duerkson, supra note 1, at 120. 
119 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[11]. 
120 Dennis, supra note 4, at A123. 
121 See Duerkson, supra note 1, at 121. For an example of such a cost-benefit analysis, see 
infra text accompanying notes 131-47. 
122 See Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[11]. For example, the Chicago 
Municipal Code provides for a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 for each violation 
of the ordinance. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, § 21-94 (1987). 
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of continued violation constituting a separate offense. 123 Many ordi-
nances also provide for imprisonment of not more than fifty days, or 
both a fine and imprisonment, for each offense. 124 
Some ordinances require reconstruction of a landmark where it 
has been willfully demolished or seriously altered. 125 Reconstruction 
can be an expensive penalty and reconstruction orders provide a 
good deterrent. 126 Courts, however, may be unlikely to order recon-
struction except in the most unusual circumstances, because it is 
often impracticable to rebuild a landmark. 127 
Despite the threat of significant fines and potential criminalliabil-
ity, preservation ordinances are generally inadequate to achieve 
their goal. This is best illustrated by the Chicago ordinance, 128 which 
failed to prevent the destruction of the Rincker House. 
In City of Chicago v. Roppolo,129 the defendant building contractor 
and his business partner purchased over five acres of land for de-
velopment purposes in 1978. 130 Several buildings stood on the land, 
including the Rincker House. 131 The Rincker House, built in 1851, 
was the second oldest building in Chicago, and was the oldest ex-
ample of the balloon frame construction method. 132 The balloon frame 
construction method is a construction type which originated in the 
Chicago area. It is significant because it allowed rapid building with 
light, standard lumber sizes, such as 2 X 4's and 2 X 6's. Chicago 
could not have expanded as rapidly as it did without the use of this 
construction technique. 133 
123 Dennis, supra note 4, at A123. 
124 [d. 
125 Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[11]. 
126 R. RODDEWIG, supra note 102, at 29. 
127 Duerkson, supra note 1, at 123-24. A typical ordinance with a reconstruction provision 
states: 
Any person who demolishes, alters, or constructs a building or structure in violation 
of sections 5,6, or 8 of this act shall be required to restore the building or structure 
and its site to its appearance prior to the violation. Any action to enforce this 
subsection shall be brought by the corporation counsel. This civil remedy shall be in 
addition to and not in lieu of any criminal prosecution and penalty. 
Dennis, supra note 4, at A124. 
128 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, §§ 21-62 to 21-64.2 (1968). 
129 113 Ill. App. 3d 602, 447 N.E.2d 870 (1983). 
130 See id. at 604, 447 N.E.2d at 872. 
131 [d. The parcel contained two grocery stores, a drugstore, a laundromat, a hamburger 
stand, the Rincker House and an adjacent toolshed. [d. The toolshed was demolished by the 
city shortly after defendant's purchase, because undesirables from a nearby Forest Preserve 
occasionally occupied the shed. Brief for Appellants at 19a, City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 
Ill. App. 3d 602, 447 N.E.2d 870 (1983) (No. 81-1167). 
132 Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 447 N.E.2d at 874. 
133 Brief for Appellants at 7, City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d 602, 447 N.E.2d 
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One month after the defendant contractor purchased the property, 
the defendant contractor arranged to demolish the Rincker House, 134 
but the city refused to issue a demolition permit. 135 On August 10, 
1979, the City Council formally approved the designation of the 
property, including the Rincker House, as a Chicago Historical Land-
mark 136 In February 1980, the defendant applied for a zoning amend-
ment in order to develop the land on which the Rincker House 
stood. 137 The Chicago Plan Commission approved the defendant's 
plan to develop the land on the condition that the defendant move 
the Rincker House to another part of the tract, and restore and 
reconstruct the house at the Commission's direction. l38 The defen-
dant agreed with this proposal, which was to be known as "Land-
mark Square. "139 
Despite this agreement, the defendant sought to escape the pro-
posal and found a demolition contractor who was willing to apply for 
a demolition permit. 140 On July 30, 1980, the demolition contractor 
began the application process. 141 After visiting the property, the 
contractor, wondering whether the house should be numbered higher 
than the address the defendant gave her, consulted with the defen-
dant.142 The defendant told her it was the correct address. The 
defendant then signed the application for the demolition permit. 143 
870 (1983) (No. 81-1167). Moreover, the Rincker House was a rare example of the carpenter 
gothic architectural style. [d. at 7-8. 
134 See Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 604, 447 N.E.2d at 872. 
135 See id. At the time of purchase, the Rincker House was occupied, but later was vacated 
and the windows boarded. [d., 447 N.E.2d at 872. 
136 [d. at 605,447 N.E.2d at 872. On June 5, 1978, the Chicago Landmark Commission had 
voted to begin proceedings to have the property declared an official Chicago landmark because 
of the architectural and historical significance of the property. [d. at 604, 447 N.E.2d at 872. 
At that time, the Chicago Municipal Code required that no building permit be issued to any 
applicant for demolition of a landmark without the written approval by the Commission on 
Chicago Historical Architectural Landmarks. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, § 21-64.1(a), 
§ 21-64.l(a)(2) (1968). In the meantime, the defendant applied a second time for a permit to 
demolish the house. Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 605, 447 N.E.2d at 872. The permit was 




140 See id. The demolition contractor, Cirro Wrecking Co., and its owner, Lela Cirrincione, 
became co-defendants in the case. The court affirmed the lower court's refusal to impose a 
constructive trust on Cirro and Cirrincione because there was nothing in the record to suggest 
that they were aware of Roppolo's obligation to the City of Chicago to move, restore and 
reconstruct the Rincker House. [d. at 617,447 N.E.2d at 880. 
141 [d. at 605, 447 N.E.2d at 873. 
142 See id. at 606, 441 N.E.2d at 873. 
143 [d., 447 N.E.2d at 873. 
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It was not, in fact, the correct address,144 and the city, therefore, 
issued the permit. Five days later the defendant's contractor de-
molished the Rincker House. 145 The Chicago Plan Commission never 
had an opportunity to review the application for a demolition per-
mit. 146 By demolishing the Rincker House without authority, the 
defendant had violated Chicago's landmark ordinance. 147 As a result, 
a building of great historic importance was lost. 148 
The Rincker House in Chicago was destroyed despite the threat 
of the statutory penalty and fines. One explanation may be that the 
fines were set too low. In fact, after the Rincker House was de-
stroyed, the Chicago City Council passed a new ordinance, increas-
144 [d. at 606, 447 N.E.2d at 874. Because of this incorrect address, the city's computer 
failed to signal and show the word "landmark" on the screen to indicate to the computer 
operator that the defendant sought a demolition application for a designated landmark. See 
id. at 607, 447 N.E.2d at 874. 
145 Id., 447 N.E.2d at 874. 
146Id. 
147 The Chicago Municipal Code stated "[n]o building permit shall issue to any applicant [for 
demolition of a landmark] without the written approval by the Commission ... where such 
permit would allow the demolition of any improvement which constitutes all or part of a 
structure or district designated as a Chicago landmark." CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, 
§ 21-64.1(a)(2) (1968). 
148 Similar willful destruction of a historic landmark occurred in Boston despite statutory 
fines in historic landmark statutes. See City of Boston v. Lutheran Service Ass'n of New 
England, No. 55927 (Mass. Super. Ct. filed July 7, 1982). As in Chicago, the penalties in 
Boston were insufficient to prevent destruction. See id. In Boston, the owner of the Margaret 
Fuller Cottage on Brook Farm allowed the landmark structure to fall into such disrepair that 
nothing of the building remains. See S. Baer, Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum, City of Boston 
v. Lutheran Service Ass'n of New England, No. 55927, at 4-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. case filed 
July 7, 1982) (memorandum, not filed, available at Boston College Environmental Affairs Law 
Review Office). The Brook Farm site is of major significance to Boston and the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts because it was the site of the early nineteenth century Transcendentalist 
social experiment and was later used as a Civil War training ground for Union troops. [d. at 
2. In 1871, a private citizen bought Brook Farm and gave it to the Lutheran Service Associ-
ation (LSA). [d. 
For 140 years, much of Brook Farm's land remained unchanged, with the exception of the 
slow deterioration of the Margaret Fuller Cottage, the last remaining building on Brook Farm. 
[d. at 4-6. In 1977, because of growing concern about the deterioration of the Cottage, Brook 
Farm was designated a historic property. See id. at 3. Following designation, the owner of 
Brook Farm, the LSA, had a statutory duty to follow the Commission's requirements regard-
ing the Margaret Fuller Cottage. See id. 
A year and a half after designation, however, the Cottage remained in desperate need of 
maintenance and repair. [d. at 4. Even after the Commission sent the LSA several notifications 
regarding the LSA's continued violations, the LSA refused to take action. [d. at 5. In the 
Spring of 1986, during a time of rapidly rising real estate costs in the Boston area, LSA began 
negotiating with developers to sell the land for developing single family housing. [d. In August 
1986, the Margaret Fuller Cottage was destroyed by arson. [d. There are no other architec-
tural remains of Brook Farm. See id. The penalties of the Boston historic preservation 
ordinance were insufficient to prevent the destruction of the landmark. 
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ing the fines from not less than ten dollars nor more than five 
hundred dollars per day to not less than five hundred dollars nor 
more than one thousand dollars per day. 149 
Perhaps the increased fine in Chicago's new ordinance will help 
deter other landmark owners from destroying their properties. It is 
likely the problem will persist, however, because the predictable 
nature of fines allows landmark owners to calculate approximately 
how much it would cost them to destroy their property. Where an 
owner sees an economic advantage to destroying a historic landmark, 
no matter how high the fines are, the owner may simply consider 
the fines an addition to the cost of development or purchasing the 
right to unencumbered land. 
Because the penalty scheme traditionally believed to provide the 
greatest deterrent to destruction of historic property has not served 
its objective, it seems clear that another remedy is appropriate. 
When a statute fails to deter future misconduct and allows past 
misconduct to result in unjust enrichment,150 a judicial remedy may 
be necessary. 
In the Roppolo case, the Illinois court did not depend solely on 
monetary fines to punish the defendant contractor. The court applied 
a restitutive remedy, the constructive trust, in addition to the pen-
alties provided for in the relevant historic preservation ordinance. 151 
The next section examines how the Roppolo court applied the con-
structive trust to a historic preservation case, and the relative ad-
vantages and disadvantages of its application. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Application of a Constructive Trust in a Historic 
Landmark Case: City of Chicago v. Roppolo 
In the Roppolo case, the Illinois court imposed a constructive trust 
on the defendant building contractor who used a fraudulently ob-
tained city demolition permit to destroy the Rincker House, a des-
ignated historic landmark. 152 The appellate court remanded the case 
to the district court for a calculation of the damages the contractor 
owed the city. 153 
149 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, § 21-64.2(a) (1968); CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 
21, § 21-94(1) (1987). 
150 See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text. 
151 City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d 602, 613, 447 N.E.2d 870, 878 (1983). 
152 See id. at 612-13, 447 N.E.2d at 878. 
153 [d. at 617, 447 N.E.2d at 881. 
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The city argued that the defendant had fraudulently obtained the 
demolition permit and that subsequent demolition saved defendant 
the expense of having to move and restore the Rincker House pur-
suant to an agreement entered into with the city plan commission, 154 
causing the defendant to be unjustly enriched. 155 The city further 
argued that the constructive trust was the appropriate equitable 
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment and cited a number of cases 
from other contexts in which a constructive trust was used. 156 
The Roppolo court imposed a constructive trust on the defendant 
for the benefit of the city.157 The court found that the defendant 
breached his statutory obligation to the city by failing to secure the 
permission of the Landmark Commission prior to demolition. 158 The 
court also found that the defendant committed a wrongful act by 
fraudulently concealing that the actual address involved was that of 
a landmark. 159 The defendant benefited from the destruction of the 
Rincker House, moreover, because he no longer had to pay for 
moving and restoration costS. 160 The court held that these findings 
were sufficient to impose a constructive trust on the defendant. 161 
The Illinois court reasoned that: "[t]he particular circumstances in 
which equity will impress a constructive trust are ... 'as numberless 
as the modes by which property may be obtained through bad faith 
and unconscientious acts."'162 The court further stated that the 
154 Brief for Appellants at 7, City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d 602, 447 N.E.2d 
870 (1983) (No. 81-1167). The city prayed for a remedy to punish defendant's misrepresenta-
tions and to prevent his unjust enrichment. The city argued that the court should use its 
equitable power to impose a constructive trust upon the property to the extent of the defen-
dant's saving of expense from demolition, with the proceeds of the trust to be put in the city's 
historic preservation fund, in addition to the penalties provided for in the ordinance. [d. 
155 See id. at 25. The saving of expense amounted to approximately $200,000-$250,000, 
according to the city. [d. 
156 [d. at 25-26. 
157 City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 602, 613, 447 N.E.2d 870, 878 (1983). 
158 See id. at 613-14, 447 N.E.2d at 878. Fraud comprises "all acts, omissions, and conceal-
ments involving a breach of a legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to another." 
[d., 447 N.E.2d at 878 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594-95 (5th ed. 1979)). 
159 [d. at 614, 447 N.E.2d at 878-79. 
160 [d. at 612-13, 447 N.E.2d at 878. 
161 [d. at 613, 447 N.E.2d at 878. The court did not, however, impose a constructive trust 
on the demolition contractor. [d. at 617,447 N.E.2d at 880. Although the court did not condone 
the demolition contractor's actions, the court found nothing in the record to suggest that the 
contractor was aware of the defendant's obligation to the city to move, restore and reconstruct 
the Rincker House. [d., 447 N.E.2d at 880. Thus, although the court found the contractor's 
actions distasteful, the court did not find her or her company liable. See id., 447 N.E.2d at 
880. 
162 [d. at 609, 447 N.E.2d at 875 (quoting County of Cook v. Barrett, 36 Ill. App. 3d 623, 
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method by which a constructive trust arises is immaterial to its 
applicability.163 In deciding whether to use a constructive trust, the 
court considered the "principles of equity, good conscience and unjust 
enrichment. "164 
Although the court did not state explicitly why it used the con-
structive trust in addition to the penalties in the ordinance, one can 
infer that it was because the penalties provided for in the ordinance 
were miniscule in comparison to the benefit gained by the defen-
dant. 165 One can infer, moreover, that the court recognized the pos-
sibility that the defendant had done a cost-benefit analysis in deter-
mining whether to tear down the Rincker House in light of the small 
and determinable fines. The ordinance's fines were minimal,166 and 
the defendant may well have used a cost-benefit analysis to decide 
that it would cost less to destroy the building and pay the fine than 
it would to move and restore the building. 167 
The imposition of a constructive trust as an equitable remedy in 
a historic landmark case was a novel reaction to the perceived in-
adequacy of existing statutory penalties. The next section discusses 
the relative merits of using an equitable remedy in such cases, and 
the applicability of the constructive trust. 
B. Evolution of the Constructive Trust as an Equitable Remedy 
and Its Appropriateness in Historic Preservation Cases 
1. The Necessity For An Equitable Remedy 
Rather than apply the constructive trust, the Roppolo court could 
have imposed only the penalties provided for in the historic preser-
vation ordinance. It then could have recommended that local legis-
latures increase the fines in their ordinances to prevent future de-
molitions. Harsher fines might well deter most landmark owners 
from demolishing their properties. 
In the Rincker House case, however, such a decision would have 
allowed the defendant to retain the benefits he wrongfully acquired. 
627, 344 N.E.2d 540 (1975), appeal denied, 63 Ill. 2d 555 (1976) (quoting 4 J. POMEROY, A 
TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1045, at 97 (5th ed. 1941))). 
163 See id. 
164 [d., 447 N.E.2d at 875. 
165 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
166 See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, § 21-64.2(a) (1968). 
167 Commentators have recognized that the defendant in this case may have performed a 
cost-benefit analysis. See Preservation Law & Taxation, supra note 1, at § 7.03[11] n.95; 
Duerkson, supra note 1, at 121. 
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Furthermore, a decision that simply recommended that municipali-
ties increase the relevant fines, without any judicial action, would 
not serve as a deterrent to future violators. In some cases, even 
higher fines would not deter landmark owners from destroying a 
landmark, if the economic return on the unencumbered property is 
greater than the cost of noncompliance. 
When a statutory penalty is not severe enough to prevent demo-
lition, as occurred in Roppolo, the wrongful act should not go un-
punished. The Roppolo court's use of an equitable remedy, in addi-
tion to the fines provided for in the ordinance, was warranted as a 
means to achieve fairness. In similar future cases, the use of an 
equitable remedy would not only prevent any unjust enrichment, 
but it would also be an effective way to deter landmark owners from 
contemplating the demolition of their properties. In light of the 
demonstrated public interest in historic preservation, the use of an 
equitable remedy to prevent destruction of historic landmarks would 
serve a useful social function. 
2. History of the Constructive Tru~t as an Equitable Remedy 
"A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of an-
other is required to make restitution to the other."168 Unjust 
enrichment169 is often punished by the imposition of restitutive rem-
edies. 170 Although the concept of restitution is one that appears 
throughout the common law, restitution occupies a particular area 
of law as a remedy for unjust enrichment. 171 
Historically, restitution developed separately at law and in eq-
uity.172 For example, at law, if a defendant stole the plaintiff's goods 
and later sold them, the plaintiff was allowed a money judgment in 
the amount of the proceeds. 173 This method of compensation has 
come to be known as a quasi-contract. 174 
In equity, if the defendant thief used the proceeds to buy land, 
the defendant was ordered to transfer title to the land to the plaintiff 
168 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). 
169 Unjust enrichment occurs when one party benefits at the expense of another party. G. 
PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 5 (1978 & Supp. 1988). For a more thorough 
discussion, see J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 1 (1951). 
170 See G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 2 (1978). 
171 See id. 
172 See id. § 1.1, at 3. 
173Id. 
174 [d. A history of quasi-contract is presented in RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTI-
TUTION 5 (1937). 
-
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by means of a constructive trust. 175 The court would consider the 
defendant a trustee of the land for the benefit of the plaintiff. 176 
Today, at law, the principal remedy is in quasi-contract, leading 
most often to a money judgment. 177 Quasi-contract developed in cases 
where a promise to pay money was "implied" as a means of allowing 
recovery for money paid or services rendered by mistake where no 
actual contract existed. 178 This remedy was used to prevent the 
unjust enrichment of the recipient of such services. 179 
In equity, the principal remedy is the constructive trust,180 which 
gives rise to a "working out" of various solutions for unjust enrich-
ment. 181 As one court has said, the usefulness of the constructive 
trust "is limited only by the inventiveness of men [and women] who 
find new ways to enrich themselves unjustly by grasping that which 
does not belong to them. "182 
Technically, although law and equity have merged, quasi-contracts 
and constructive trusts remain separate restitutive remedies. 183 
Many courts today, however, often find it easier to choose the con-
structive trust as a remedy, even when the judgment is one for 
money and can be obtained at law. l84 When neither a constructive 
175 There are two different kinds of trust: express and implied. An express trust is a fiduciary 
relationship with respect to property, arising out of a manifestation of intent to create the 
trust. 5 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 62.1 (3d ed. 1967). An implied trust means a resulting trust or a 
constructive trust, neither of which depends on an intent of the parties to create it. See G. 
BOGERT, TRUSTS § 71 (6th ed. 1987). A constructive trust, which lacks the attributes of a 
true trust, 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 139 (1955 & Supp. 1989), arises when a court wishes to achieve 
an equitable result, as in a case of unjust enrichment. [d.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 23 (1959); 3 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (2d. 1978). 
A constructive trust is also called ex maleficio or ex delicto, 3 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 471 (2d ed. 1978). 
176 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 3-4 (1978). 
177 [d. § 1.1, at 4. A quasi-contract, as a restitutive remedy, should not be confused with a 
contract form of action. See, e.g., id. at 8. 
m [d. at 7. 
179 [d. 
l80 [d. § 1.1, at 4. Equitable lien, SUbrogation and equitable accounting are other equitable 
devices frequently used to prevent unjust enrichment. [d. For a description of these remedies, 
see id. § 1. 5, at 20-29. 
181 [d. § 1.4, at 17. 
182 Latham v. Father Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 27, 85 N.E.2d 168, 171 (1949) (court imposed a 
constructive trust on defendant devisees for the benefit of plaintiffs because defendants, 
through fraud and coercion, kept the testatrix from making a will in favor of the plaintiffs), 
G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.4, at 17 (1978 & Supp. 1988). 
IS3 See id. § 1.3, at 16. 
l84 [d. (citing Hochman v. Zigler's Inc., 139 N.J. Eq. 139, 50 A.2d 97 (1946) (In Hochman, 
the court, noting that the judgment was appropriately rendered through a constructive trust 
rather than at law in assumpsit, named de+'endant lessor a constructive trustee for the benefit 
of plaintiff lessee, for the money lessor obtained by threatening not to renew the plaintiff's 
lease)). 
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trust, embracing all of a wrongdoer's unjustly acquired property, 
nor a quasi-contract remedy is wholly appropriate, courts have 
shaped the constructive trust doctrine to fit the circumstances to 
achieve equity.185 The discussion below illustrates the wide applica-
tion of a constructive trust. 
3. Constructive Trust Case Law 
In the early cases, courts recognized the constructive trust as an 
equitable device by which the holder of legal title to land was ordered 
to convey title to a party rightfully entitled to the beneficial inter-
est. 186 Plaintiffs did not have to prove that they had suffered any 
monetary loss or that the defendant had profited from the acquisition 
of title. 187 A plaintiff had to prove, rather, that title to the land had 
been wrongfully obtained. 188 
Courts have considered several conditions or requirements for the 
imposition of a constructive trust. 189 These requirements include: a 
confidential relationship or a fiduciary duty; a wrongful act, such as 
fraud, duress, or undue influence; and unjust enrichment. 190 
Over the years, the constructive trust has developed from a lim-
ited remedy used in cases where title or property had been wrong-
fully obtained19l to a more expansive remedy limited only by the 
185 Id. § 1.3, at 15-16 (citing Tebin v. Moldock, 14 N.Y.2d 807, 200 N.E.2d 216 (1964) (In 
Tebin, the court limited the scope of the constructive trust imposed on the defendant heiress 
niece for the benefit of decedent's son, by reducing it from all of the assets of the estate to 
$25.00 per month». 
186 See G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471, at 3 (2d ed. 1978). 
187 See id. § 1.3, at 16. 
188 Id. 
189 See id. § 1.4, at 18. 
190 Id. § 1.4, at 18, 20. 
191 For example, the Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust in Angle v. Chicago, St. 
Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1894). In Angle, a contractor who had contracted 
to work for the original property owner, see id. at 7, sought payment for work done for the 
defendant who had obtained title to the property through his wrongful acts. Id. at 27. Finding 
that the defendant wrongfully obtained title to the land, id., and that equity required the 
plaintiff to be paid, see id. at 27, the Court imposed a constructive trust on defendant. See 
id. The Court stated that: 
whenever the legal title to property ... has been obtained through actual fraud, 
misrepresentation, concealments, or through undue influence ... or under any similar 
circumstances which render it unconscientious for the holder of the legal title to 
retain and enjoy the beneficial interest, equity impresses a constructive trust on the 
property ... in favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to the same, 
although he may never perhaps have had any legal estate therein. 
Id. at 26-27 (citing 4 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1053 (5th ed. 
1941». 
In Newton v. Parter, 69 N.Y. 133 (1877), thieves stole plaintiff's bonds and invested the 
proceeds in securities. The thieves were subsequently arrested. Id. at 135. Thereafter, the 
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"inventiveness" of human beings. 192 More recently, courts have been 
willing to mold a constructive trust to fit various circumstances when 
a money judgment or specific restitution is not adequate. 193 In fact, 
even if the judgment is one for money and can be obtained at law, 
in quasi-contract, courts have frequently granted relief through the 
imposition of a constructive trust. 194 
The constructive trust is used, perhaps most notably, when a 
person acquires legal title to property through some sort of egregious 
wrongdoing. For example, in Estate of Mahoney,195 the court held 
that a wife who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter of her 
husband could be charged as a constructive trustee of the decedent's 
estate for the benefit of the decedent's heirs if it could be shown that 
the wife willfully killed the decedent. 196 The court noted that, al-
though legal title may pass to the slayer according to the probate 
thieves hired defendants as their lawyers and used the securities to pay the lawyers, who had 
notice of the unlawful origin of the securities. Id. at 136. The court transferred title to the 
securities to the plaintiff as an equitable owner, by means of a constructive trust imposed on 
defendants. Id. at 137-40. The court applied the constructive trust even though the conven-
tional relationship of trustee and cestui que trust was lacking. Id. at 139. It stated that 
plaintiff's equitable right to follow the proceeds "would continue and attach to any securities 
or property, in which the proceeds were invested, so long as they could be traced and identified, 
and the rights of bona fide purchasers had not intervened." Id. at 137-38. 
The Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust on the defendants in Moore v. Crawford, 
130 U.S. 122 (1889), in which the defendants fraudulently obtained title to land. Id. at 123, 
129. Finding that the defendant seller fraudulently conveyed title of the property to his wife 
rather than to the plaintiff buyers, id. at 128-29, the court stated that defendant breached 
his duty to plaintiff. See id. at 133. The Court saw the need for an equitable remedy, and 
imposed a constructive trust. See id. at 129. 
The Supreme Court, however, has not always imposed constructive trusts in cases where 
the remedy was seemingly appropriate. For example, Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) 
involved a dispute over the proper beneficiaries of a life insurance policy. See id. at 47. In 
Ridgway, a Maine court had issued a divorce decree ordering an army sergeant to keep in 
force his life insurance policy for the benefit of his three children, see id. at 48. Subsequently, 
the army sergeant remarried and changed the policy's beneficiary designation, directing that 
the proceeds be paid "by law." Id. Under the applicable statute the proceeds would be paid 
to the lawful spouse at the time of the insured's death. Id. at 48-49. The army sergeant then 
died, and the two wives brought suit to collect the proceeds of the policy. The first wife asked 
the court to impose a constructive trust for the children's benefit for any policy proceeds paid 
to the second wife. Id. The court held that the imposition of a constructive trust in this case 
was inconsistent with the statute governing the policy, under which an insured service member 
could freely designate a beneficiary at any time. [d. at 55-60. Thus, the Court denied the 
imposition of a constructive trust, see id. at 60, even though the Court admitted the decision 
went against the "equities" which favored the minor children and their mother. See id. at 62. 
i92 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.4, at 17 (1978). 
i93 See id. § 1.3, at 15-16. 
i94 Id. § 1.3, at 16. 
i95220 A.2d 475 (Vt. 1966); see also Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) 
(court imposed a constructive on grandson who, overeager to acquire the remainder interest 
in his grandfather's will, murdered his grandfather). 
i96 220 A.2d at 479. 
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statutes of descent and distribution, "equity holds him to be a con-
structive trustee for the heirs . . . of the decedent. "197 The court 
stated that: "[t]he legal title will not pass to the slayer because of 
the equitable principles that no one should be permitted to profit by 
his own fraud, or take advantage and profit as a result of his wrong 
or crime."I98 
Courts have applied the constructive trust in cases where the 
property holder's conduct has not been so heinous. For example, in 
Snepp v. United States, 199 the Supreme Court imposed a constructive 
trust for the federal government's benefit on the profits from a 
former CIA agent's book. 200 The former agent, by writing about his 
experiences in the CIA, violated a pre-employment agreement with 
the CIA that he would not write about any classified material, and 
that he would seek pre-publication clearance for any material. 201 
Accepting the lower court's findings that the agent had deliber-
ately violated his obligation to submit all material for pre-publication 
review, and as a result had exposed classified information to the risk 
of disclosure,202 the Court held that the author violated the CIA's 
trust and breached a fiduciary obligation. 203 The Court imposed a 
constructive trust on the agent, holding the agent as a constructive 
trustee of the profits on the book for the benefit of the United 
States.204 The Court recognized the constructive trust as an appro-
priate remedy because the relief conformed to the "dimensions of 
the wrong," and because it provided a good deterrent to future 
violations. 205 
The Snepp case is significant because it illustrates: (1) the Supreme 
Court's acceptance of government plaintiffs in such cases; (2) the 
Court's willingness to impose a constructive trust in cases that do 
not relate to land; and (3) the Court's willingness to use the construc-
tive trust as a deterrent device. 
Other courts have also been willing to expand the application of 
the constructive trust. For example, in LaBarbera v. LaBarbera,206 
197 [d. at 477. 
198 [d. 
199 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
200 [d. at 507-08, 516. 
201 [d. at 507-08. 
202 [d. at 509, 511. 
209 See id. at 510-11. The Court agreed with the lower courts' findings that the CIA agent's 
publication of information that had not been cleared relating to intelligence activities could be 
detrimental to vital national interests. [d. at 511-12. 
204 [d. at 507-08, 516. 
205 See id. at 515. 
206 116 Ill. App. 3d 959, 452 N.E.2d 684 (1983). 
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the appellate court of Illinois imposed a constructive trust on one 
half of the funds listed in an agreement between two brothers. 207 In 
LaBarbera, one brother, who managed his mother's affairs after his 
father's death, misappropriated some of his brother's money.208 Find-
ing a breach of the special relationship between defendant and his 
parents, the court imposed a constructive trust to prevent defen-
dant's unjust enrichment. 209 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit molded the 
constructive trust to fit the circumstances of Chisholm v. Western 
Reserves Oil CO.21O In Chisholm, the court found that an implied 
contract existed between the defendant oil company and the plaintiff 
gas lease broker.211 The court found that by not paying the plaintiff 
for his services, the defendant breached both the implied contract 
and the confidential relationship between the defendant oil company 
and the plaintiff gas lease broker. 212 To remedy this breach, the court 
imposed a constructive trust. 213 
In reaching this decision, the court stated that a constructive trust 
can be used wherever specific restitution in equity is appropriate on 
the facts.214 According to the court, a constructive trust may be used 
where there has been embezzlement of money, conversion of goods, 
a benefit transferred under mistake, or where there has been fraud, 
duress, or undue influence, or where gains have been received by 
misuses of position. 215 The court added that especially the "murderer 
for gain," such as the wife in Mahoney, may be a constructive 
trustee. 216 The court stated, moreover, that it was immaterial how 
the unjust enrichment occurred.217 Courts will exercise their discre-
tion in deciding on the type of conduct that can justify the imposition 
of a constructive trust. 218 
207 [d. at 961, 966, 452 N.E.2d 686, 689. 
208 See id. at 965, 452 N.E.2d at 688-89. 
209 See id. at 966, 452 N.E.2d at 689. 
210 655 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981). 
211 See id. at 95-96. 
212 [d. at 97. 
213 [d. 
214 See id. at 96. 
215 [d. (citing D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 246 (1973)). 
216 Chisholm, 655 F.2d at 96. 
217 [d. The court commented that what is important is the fairness and workability of the 
judicial decree. [d. 
218 See G. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 77, at 288 (6th ed. 1987); see also Beatty v. Guggenheim 
Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 389, 122 N.E.2d 378,381 (1919) ("A court of equity in decreeing 
a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must 
shape the measure of relief."). 
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4. The Appropriateness of Applying the Constructive Trust 
Doctrine in Historic Landmark Violation Cases 
819 
Because courts are willing to mold the constructive trust to fit 
different circumstances,219 the court's use of the constructive trust 
in the Rincker House case was an appropriate remedy. All of the 
traditional conditions of a constructive trust existed.220 The defen-
dant: (1) had a duty to the city, both statutory and according to the 
agreement he had signed,221 (2) breached the duty by fraudulently 
obtaining the demolition permit,222 and (3) received the benefit of 
not having to move, reconstruct, and restore the Rincker House, 
and thus was unjustly enriched by gaining unencumbered property 
without paying fair market value, at the expense of the city. 223 
Despite the attacks by critics at the use of the constructive trust 
in Roppolo,224 a constructive trust was not only appropriate, but 
afforded a better remedy than the city would have had in quasi-
contract. Although the final judgment was for money and could have 
been obtained at law under a "savings of expense" rationale, the 
court was correct in choosing the constructive trust because of its 
strong potential as an effective remedy for future historic preser-
vation cases. For example, if the cost of moving and restoring was 
$20,000, then the judgment at law would only have been for $20,000. 
The expense saved might still be nominal relative to the benefit 
conferred. This method of punishment, similar to statutory penalties, 
would no longer serve as a deterrent. Forceful deterrence value 
exists in the potential for a large financial disgorgement that can be 
obtained only with the constructive trust, with the court molding it 
to fit the particular circumstances. The constructive trust as applied 
in Roppolo, therefore, leaves the door open for future courts to use 
the constructive trust to recover profits from real estate develop-
ment as well as amounts saved through circumvention of obligations 
associated with the property's landmark status. 
219 See supra notes 199-218 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text. 
221 See City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d 602, 614, 447 N.E.2d 870, 878 (1983); 
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 21, § 21-64.1. 
222 See Roppolo, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 612-14, 447 N.E.2d at 878-79. 
223 [d. at 613-14, 447 N.E.2d at 878-79. 
224 See G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.3, at 16 n.27 (1978 & Supp. 1988). At 
least one commentator, citing the Roppolo case, claimed that many judges find it easier to 
remedy unjust enrichment by using a constructive trust, even though a money judgment is 
possible and can be obtained at law in quasi-contract, G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 
§ 1.3, at 16 (1978 & Supp. 1988). He further stated that a constructive trust "stirs the judicial 
imagination" in ways that quasi-contractual remedies have not. [d. 
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In light of historic preservation's primary goal, which is to prevent 
demolition rather than simply to punish violations after the fact, a 
constructive trust would serve as a more forceful deterrent to future 
landmark owners. Although the constructive trust cannot recreate 
a historic landmark, it is likely to serve as the most effective deter-
rent to other landowners who may do a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine whether the demolition and subsequent payment of fines 
are worthwhile. If landowners know that their profits may be dis-
gorged, and that they may have to pay for the restoration costs that 
were avoided by permitting the property to deteriorate, they may 
hesitate to neglect or destroy their property. If the defendant in 
Roppolo had known that he would have to pay the moving and 
restoration costs of the Rincker House to the city, he may have kept 
the landmark intact and used the restoration money for actual res-
toration and not for satisfaction of a judicial decree. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Landmark preservation is an area of growing concern. As land 
values increase, landowners have sought to "cash in" on their prop-
erty at the expense of important public interests. The main source 
of this problem is the insufficiency of current penalties, and to a 
large degree, the predictability of the fines and their amenability to 
a cost-benefit analysis. Local governments can and should seek eq-
uitable relief through the imposition of constructive trusts, and 
courts must consider the constructive trust and apply it when the 
circumstances require. 
Courts should take the Roppolo court's lead and impose a con-
structive trust when a landowner has violated his or her duty to 
prevent the demolition of a designated landmark and has thereby 
been unjustly enriched. In an effort to keep our national landmarks 
intact, more courts should use this remedy as a method of punishing 
wrongdoers and of deterring other landmark owners from allowing 
personal profit motives to outweigh society's interest in historic 
preservation. 
